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Resumen— En la ciberseguridad y la 
informática, el término "Zero-day" se relaciona 
comúnmente con problemas, amenazas y 
peligros, esto debido a la falta de conocimiento, 
experiencia o malentendidos relacionados. Un 
ataque de Zero-day se considera generalmente 
una nueva vulnerabilidad sin defensa; por lo 
tanto, el ataque consecuente tendrá una alta 
probabilidad de riesgo, y un impacto crítico. 
Lamentablemente, sólo unos pocos estudios 
están  disponibles  para  comprender  estas 
amenazas, y no bastan para construir nuevas 
soluciones para detectar, prevenir y mitigar 
estas dificultades. En este artículo, se presenta 
una revisión del ataque Zero-day, enfocándose 
en comprender su impacto real y algunas 
soluciones accesibles  hoy  en  día. Este estudio 
presenta una referencia útil que proporciona 
a los investigadores conocimientos para 
comprender el problema actual relacionado 
con los ataques Zero-day. Este puede ser un 
punto de partida para desarrollar soluciones 
para combatir este problema.
Palabras clave— Zero-day, vulnerabilidad, 
ataque, impacto, implementación.
 
Abstract— In  cybersecurity  and  computer 
science,  the  term “zero-day” is commonly 
related to troubles, threats, and hazards 
due to the lack of knowledge, experience, 
or misunderstanding. A zero-day attack is 
generally considered a new vulnerability with 
no defense;  thus,  the  possible  attack  will  have 
a  high  risk probability,  and  a  critical  impact. 
Unfortunately,  only  a  few surveys on the topic 
are available that would help understand these 
threats, which are not enough to construct 
new solutions to detect, prevent, and mitigate 
X. Riofrio, F. Astudillo-Salinas, L.Tello-Oquendo and J. Merchan-Lima, “ Zero-day attack: Deployment and evolution”, 
Latin-American Journal of Computing (LAJC), vol. 8, no. 1, 2021.
them. In this paper, it is conducted a review 
of  the  zero-day  attack,  how  to  understand 
its  real impact, and a few different accessible 
solutions nowadays. This study introduces a 
useful reference that provides researchers with 
knowledge to understand the current problem 
concerning zero-days attacks; hence they 
could develop solutions for facing them.
Keywords— Zero-day, vulnerability, attack, 
impact, deploy- ment.
I. INTRODUCTION
No operating system or software is entirely 
secure, humans develop them, and humans 
often make mistakes. In this sense, security 
is essential and constant updates are needed 
to cover emerging susceptibilities. These 
software holes are known as vulnerabilities; 
they can also result from misconfigurations or 
errors in the code, which create problems that 
could be exploited by several actors, such as 
cybercriminals, competitors, ethical hackers, or 
malicious people.
Zero-days are undiscovered vulnerabilities; 
this term was used initially for developers with 
“zero days” to fix a re- spective vulnerability. It 
demands  their  attention  as  urgent as possible, 
trying to avoid exposure as much as probable; 
although, usually at this stage, threat actors 
(hackers) have already taken advantage of it. 
They are dangerous because they are unknown, 
there are no preliminary data available, and 
these vulnerabilities are only known by threat 
actors. There are no updates available and no 
anti-virus scanners can detect them. Therefore, 
criminals are free to gain access through 
computer assets, getting benefits without 
obstruction. Software with these bugs could 
be trendy, such as Microsoft systems, adobe 
software, or even security products as firewalls. 
It becomes even more critical and complex to 
control within web systems because they are 
built using several components or libraries from 
different vendors. It is a challenge to manage 
the different versions of these components or 
libraries and patch them; for example, a web 
application can be developed in Angular JS, 
which is a set of libraries in JavaScript with 
their modules or external add-ons (unknown 
sources) for complementary functions. In this 
case, the attack surface becomes enormous and 
it will be unmanageable for the development 
team to reduce the damage [1].
The zero-day term could be referred to as 
diverse ideas in the same context. Firstly, zero-
day vulnerability refers to the software being 
exposed and further indicates that neither 
software ownership nor security products 
such as antivirus scanners knew its existence. 
Second, zero-day exploit refers to threat actors 
who have developed code or performs an 
action for this zero-day vulnerability to directly 
affects assets; generally is developed by the 
person who finds the fault. However, it could be 
exploited with negative or positive intentions; 
section II-C1 gives more details about the 
stakeholders. Finally, a zero-day attack consists 
of the direct abuse of a particular computer, 
application, system, or data, taking advantage 
of the zero-day vulnerability through a zero-
day exploit. The latter represents the final 
objective of the two previous definitions [2], 
[3].
In general, the zero-day vulnerabilities are a 
problem with an underestimated impact. This 
problem is not considered extremely important 
for ordinary users because companies receive 
bug reports (or find their bugs) and just patch 
them. They minimize their errors, do not disclose 
related data, and avoid disclosing details as 
feasible. The reason to do this is to hinder 
cyber-criminals attention so that they do not 
take advantage of the exposure. Nevertheless, 
this will not prevent it from being exploited; 
usually, the exploit appears on the same day as 
announced, demonstrating that obscurantism 
is not a significant obstacle to threat actors. It is 
worth noting that an exploit is a malicious code 
that abuses flaws in software to infect, interrupt, 
or control a computer without the user’s 
consent and usually without their knowledge 
[4]. Furthermore, little analysis has been made 
of the real-life phases of the difficulties related 
to zero-day, which contributes to the fact that 
those in charge of computers are not seriously 
focused on addressing these issues [5].
In the following, two examples to illustrate 
zero-day attacks are described. The first one 
is Stuxnet; it was a type of zero-day attack 
and used as a digital weapon (a pioneer in 
this domain). This malware is classified as a 
virus/worm and was addressed at the uranium 
enrichment plant’s computers in Iran. It 
exploited five zero-day vulnerabilities to spread 
and gain privileged access to the systems. 
Microsoft patched one of the vulnerabilities 
on time; nevertheless, the Microsoft patch was 
not enough; criminals  attacked,  took  control 
of the computers altering the plants’ settings, 
and achieved to shut down the nuclear 
plant. Although this happened in 2010, these 
vulnerabilities are still a threat today, especially 
CVE- 2010-25681, which is Windows Server 
2003 vulnerability [7], [8].
The  second  is  F5  BIG-IP,  a  modern  one,  which 
tries  to demonstrate the problem in present 
days. This zero-day attack was disclosed in 
July 2020 and is a Remote Code Execution 
(RCE) vulnerability, which affects each product 
related to the BIG-IP for the company F5 
Networks. This allows executing code in the 
vulnerable server by sending a specifically 
single HTTP request to the server hosting the 
traffic management user interface. The relevant 
role of the attack is the extensive vulnerable 
surface; the software is widely used around the 
world, and according to SHODAN2 there are 
more than 31000 recognizable devices of this 
type, as illustrated in Figure 1. This indicates 
that all of those  are  potentially  vulnerable and 
need to be patched. Several authors developed 
exploits immediately; in less than one day, 
they were spread beyond the Internet (Twitter, 
Reddit, blogs, among others), demonstrating 
that this zero-day vulnerability could be 
exploited without too much knowledge. This 
example shows that a security hole could be 
exploited in hours, representing a significant 
threat to the valuables with critical impact [9], 
[10].
The concern about zero-day dangers is 
authentic and real. Researchers have focused 
on countering the problems and creating 
solutions considering the victim’s rapid 
reaction to minimize or disappear the risks 
presented by those vulnerabilities. Despite 
this, the most significant challenge when 
developing solutions is a lack of practical and 
concrete information; this is needed to test and 
find errors. Another limitation is the extremely 
low probability of finding a new bug; it takes 
millions of files to find a unique vulnerability; 
besides, false positives must be controlled. 
These reasons demonstrate the concern of a 
laboratory for investigating this issue because 
it allows us to have a better understanding of 
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1Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a document in a 
database with extensive information detailing vulnerabilities, technical 
issues, and the disclosure dates; this is a standard used and accepted 
for academia, govern- mental organizations, private developers, and 
the cyber-security industry  [6]
2A search engine specialized in Internet-connected devices, used for 
secu- rity people to look for assets connected to the web
Figure 1: Number of BIG-IP devices connected and found in 
the internet [11].
3A PoC in the cybersecurity field is used for demonstrating that an 
exploit is possible on an established system, which is an initial proof 
because sometimes it is not necessary to attack the objective; testers 
solely require to prove their idea [14].
how the attack is carried out and how it should 
be prevented and detected [2].
The main contributions of this study are the 
following:
(i) Creating a concrete and 
straightforward source of information to 
begin the understanding of what are the 
zero-day attacks.
(ii) Revealing the impact and defining the 
life cycle that could have an attack of this 
type.
(iii) Analyzing and comparing solutions 
existing nowadays to face these attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II describes the real impact of these 
attacks in real environments; this is based on 
collected data from computers in use over the 
Internet. On the other hand, in Section III, some 
approaches that exist as countermeasures to 
prevent, detect, and mitigate this predicament 
are described. Section IV provides a general 
discussion of the zero-day, their current 
countermeasures solutions, and a brief analysis 
of the open issues and challenges that could be 
addressed in future works. Finally, conclusions 
and future work are explained in Section V.
II.ANALYSIS OF A ZERO-DAY
The effect and impact of a zero-day depend on 
the mode of detection, the affected product, 
who finds it, and other factors. These will 
mutate the difficulty depending on each unique 
scenario. This section explains some of the 
critical circumstances to analyze and consider 
a zero-day vulnerability’s real impact. First, 
the deployment cycle of a zero-day attack is 
introduced; then, its lifetime cycle is explained; 
finally, the real-life impact of this attacks on 
several factors is discussed.
A.Zero-day deployment cycle
The deployment cycle for a zero-day attack 
could vary from each case. However, it is 
considered a common scenario with two 
significant phases that threat actors follow to 
proceed with the attack, as shown in Figure 
2. The next steps are performed for white and 
black hat hackers to abuse weaknesses. These 
steps could be in a different order and may go 
through multiple repetitions [7], [12]. The term 
white and black hat hackers is a categorization 
where the principles of a hacker are focused. 
Both groups usually have extensive knowledge 
of how to break into applications, computer 
networks, and bypass security protocols. 
Black hat hackers can be involved in cyber 
espionage,  terrorism,  or just for challenging 
cybercrimes. Their primary motivation is 
financial, and they are responsible for writing 
malware and exploits. On the opposite, white 
hat hackers use their skills for the right team, 
called “ethical hackers” sometimes earn money 
for reporting bugs to the official sources [13].
1)Discovery phase: The goal of this phase is 
to find a zero-day vulnerability. The threat 
actor attempts to recognize, observe, detect, 
and even guess possible vulnerabilities of a 
respective surface target. Thus, with a clear 
idea of how the target is built and structured, 
the threat actor could audit and inspect it to 
determine a specific flaw and then move on to 
a triage stage to test their ideas and findings to 
generate an inherent exploit. In the following, it 
is presented each of the stages of this phase.
(i) Recognition: The initial action of 
exploitation is to discover what can  be 
vulnerable,  finding  components to start 
searching defects issues. While more 
elements found, more chances of finding a 
security flaw. Therefore, security researchers 
typically use tools that help them search 
for these elements in an automated and 
agile method such a fuzzers or subdomain 
listers. However, they do not discard manual 
analysis that provides a more advanced 
strategy and adds the ability to go deeper 
into hidden vulnerabilities [14].
through disassembling tools. As previously 
affirmed, humans make mistakes, and the 
code is written for humans; consequently, 
it is a method to find their errors. Besides, 
other techniques are applied, such as binary 
analysis, fuzzing methods that consist of 
sending a set of payloads until finding one 
that harms the objective and performing a 
logical review of the application or system 
operation. The payload is part of an exploit, 
which is the portion of the code not related 
to propagation nor concealment, i.e., it is in 
charge of performing the malicious action. 
From the threat actor’s point of view, this 
is where he takes advantage of the system 
[15].
(iii) Triage: This process involves 
identifying, tracking, and determining 
the root cause of the fault in the code; 
specifically, the part of the application code 
is being vulnerable and will be exploited. 
The reason is to exploit the error in the most 
optimal approach and have a significant 
and more harmful impact. In this step, there 
is usually a difference between white hat 
hackers, who will stop at one point not 
to damage critical assets, while black hat 
hackers will continue as much damage as 
possible because their goal is precisely that.
2)Exploitation phase: In this second phase, 
“Exploitation”, researchers take their 
vulnerability found apriori and create a 
sufficiently functional exploit. For that, with the 
verdicts previously found, it starts to develop 
a potential exploit. It would help if they 
debugged with different techniques and types 
of attacks to take advantage of this flaw. Once 
the exploit is identified, the developed focus 
on their effectiveness and efficiency. Finally, 
concluding with the deployment of the PoC 
(Proof of Concept)3 in a real environment and 
with the risk of being compromised.
(i) Debug: At this point, the individual who 
found the vulner- ability should evaluate the 
techniques and approaches to exploit it and 
make the exploit effective. Once evaluated, 
the threat actor determines precisely what 
can do exploiting it, the potential impact, 
and other requirements needed to reduce 
the uncertainty and create a fully functional 
exploit. It is possible to return to previous 
phases, principally if it does not impact or 
find more complementary vulnerabilities. 
Generally, exploitation will consist of 
multiple vulnerabilities, such as Stuxnet’s 
example, and each will contribute to the 
optimal exploitation.
(ii) Audit: The next action is to start 
looking for vulnerabilities in the components 
beforehand found. In this position, diverse 
operations may be performed; a threat 
actor can start analyzing the code directly, 
performing a binary analysis or reviewing 
the business logic. Although companies 
try to hide them, they will be accessible 
(ii) Exploit: Once the accurate method is 
identified jointly with how and  what  will 
be  exploited,  it  is  necessary to begin 
applying and testing  them, determining 
their effectiveness, and reviewing several 
scenarios to confirm the PoC. Initially, it will 
be a simple exploit, but as it is developed, 
it could increase the impact. For instance, 
to escalate privileges or automate actions. 
There is also the option to cover tracks and 
cleanup footprint to avoid an effortless 
discovery of this zero-day.
(iii) Deploy: Finally, the cycle continues 
to push this zero-day exploit in a real 
environment; notwithstanding secure 
laboratory variations, the real world 
may imply extra obstacles. For black 
hackers, they can do the damage to the 
compromised systems or sell it on the black 
market. However, for white hat hackers, 
it is up to  them  to create a tangible and 
real PoC or report the flaw directly to the 
corresponding entity. This topic is discussed 
in Section II-C2.
It is worth emphasizing that every zero-day 
vulnerability does not convert to a zero-day 
attack. Sometimes security issues do not lead 
to exploitable vulnerabilities, do not present 
a real impact, or they are identified for the 
company before someone can exploit them.
B.Lifetime cycle
Generally, a widespread belief is that a zero-
day is working in the background for a short 
amount of time because vendors mitigate and 
release patches as soon as they appear, but 
this is not always the  case.  Furthermore,  it 
is  believed  by  the IT community that after 
being disclosed, this vulnerability will become 
obsolete or at least with a lower frequency 
of use [5].  This segment will answer these 
and other related myths, aiming to detail the 
authentic lifetime cycle of a zero-day, from its 
initial discovery until it is supposed dead.
The first point to answer is when a vulnerability 
appears in a production environment; due to 
improperly tested or ignored issues. Then, 
once in production, this error will be exposed 
for an indeterminate period, as shown in Figure 
3. Besides, it will end when the vendor officially 
releases the patch, consequently going from 
being exposed indeterminately to being 
exposed for out-of-date software [16].
Nevertheless, the exposure time is not equal 
such as a zero-day attack sequence. When 
the vulnerability is found, criminals develop 
it, and the vulnerability will be exploited until 
official sources publish the respective CVE. 
Nevertheless, while criminals are abusing in 
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Figure 2: The zero-day attack deployment cycle.
Figure 3: The time line for a zero-day attack [5].
Figure 4: Markets and stakeholders related with zero-days.
this time interval, the vulnerability should 
be discovered by official sources or security 
researchers (company consulting team, bug 
hunters, or other community members). 
Finally, when the zero-day is disclosed publicly, 
security vendors such as antivirus scanners 
should develop their solution to find these new 
threats [17].
It should be highlighted that these actions 
frequently do not always occur in the 
corresponding order as Figure 3, although 
there is always an exposure time before the 
vulnerability disclosed publicly, and the patch 
released is always later or equal to this date.
Nonetheless, what happens after its disclosure? 
To have an answer, it is necessary to know 
when a vulnerability indeed dies. It is thought 
that it is dead when the patch is released, 
either because there is not enough information 
about its longevity or due to the fact that 
providers do not release this data for security 
reasons. However, the study of [7] shows that 
exploits have an average lifetime of 6.9 years, 
some of which remain active for more than 
ten years, new versions continually appear; 
therefore, they are considered ’immortal’. It 
also demonstrates that these zero-days will 
consider as a short lifetime cycle whether 
they have 1.51 years or less, but this occurs in 
hardly a quarter of the data analyzed. On the 
contrast, the longevity group will live more 
than 9.53 years, representing a 25 percent 
more longlasting exploits.
C.Real life impact
It has been already talked about attacks and 
how they are carried out, but is the impact 
visible and serious in real life?. Several factors 
influence in this topic, the next arguments are 
the most significant and are referenced to 
Figure 4.
1)Stakeholders in the zero-day surface:   [13].
Security researchers concentrate on finding 
zero-day vulnerabilities and report them to the 
provider, sometimes for money and sometimes 
for fame. Usually, these vulnerabilities are 
released into the public domain through 
published vulnerability advisories, blogs, and 
news. Software vendors have their security 
team, but in most cases, this is not enough, 
then they launch an external consultancy for 
researchers.
These businesses are speedily expanding; 
programs such a HackerOne, BugCrown, 
or Vulnscope (for Latin America) pay 
independent researchers (called bug hunters) 
to find vulnerabilities in private programs. They 
do not exploit a full zero-day attack, instead of 
they develop a very basic PoC exploit for it and 
get a payment. In this way, vendors will have 
an external extensive security team that brings 
excellent results and they could offer more 
reliable products [14].
Lastly, enterprises specialized in zero-day 
such as Exodus Intelligence, ZDI and iDefense 
find these attacks and provide data for their 
subscribers to use for defensive testing and 
product protection measures. These groups 
belong to the white group.
In contrast, for the dark side, the stakeholders 
are nations, cybercriminals, competitors, or 
hobbyists with another motivation. They will 
sell their findings privately in different markets 
[13].
2)Zero day markets: In recent years, zero-
day vulnerability markets have been growing 
exponentially and are divided by the buyer, 
the public vs. private, the vulnerability’s nature, 
and the threat’s objective. The subsequent 
categorization will focus on these points.
The first is a white market, used for bug hunters 
to report the found vulnerabilities over to the 
affected vendor. They use them for defensive 
purposes such as new patches or improvement 
of new versions. It depends on the vendors, 
whether should be disclosed or remains private.
Next is a grey market, vulnerabilities continue 
to be confidential among initiators and 
collaborators, which are used primarily for 
offensive attacks rather than defensive. They 
will remains in the background, used against 
the affected provider, although they are 
usually sold towards governments or national 
institutions which could use them in diverse 
purposes, for this reasons they shall not be 
divulged.
Finally, black markets are sold for criminals 
where the vulnerabilities are not disclosed 
because they will use them for illicit purposes. 
The buyers could be competitors vendors, 
cyber-terrorists or even nations. This market is 
the most profitable market because it is illegal 
and may pay large amounts of money for 
exploits capable of damaging an organization 
[13].
3)Evolution of the zero-day: The paper has 
been discussed the development of a zero-day 
attack and its lifetime cycle, without specifying 
what indeed occurs and how changing in 
these stages in a wild scenery. Here arises a 
point of inflection where the exploitation rises 
exaggeratedly, this point is after its disclosure:
Zero-day vulnerabilities before disclosure 
regularly rises and remains running in a context 
such as the black market members, security 
researchers, or small groups of hackers. 
Each group wants to avoid discovered their 
goal is to take advantage of the vulnerability 
as much as possible (for white and black hat 
hackers).  Therefore,  the  number  of  attacks 
at this stage is low for two reasons: the number 
of threat actors is low, and the number of 
targets is limited. Most zero-day attacks do 
not  exceed  1000  attempts,  as  shown in 
Figure  5.  This  point  is  directly  proportional 
to  how  is the exploit evolution and variations 
(Figure 6); the malware remains hidden and 
continues without threat; therefore, it has no 
problem attacking, do not need to change to 
be effective.
On the other hand, once the flaw is publicly 
exposed, Zero-day vulnerabilities after 
disclosure increased logarithmically. This 
fact is produced because whether a system 
vulnerability is revealed or widespread, 
each actor in this environment will have the 
possibility of exploiting that (they indeed would 
attack). Although no extensive information  is 
revealed  in the CVEs, exploits and attacking 
methods are immediately developed. Figure 
6 demonstrates that malware  variations also 
present a logarithmic growth. Consequently, 
victims of this vulnerability are more exposed 
at this point and have a significant probability 
of being attacked, representing an extreme 
boosting number of attacks after t0. This 
behavior is exhibited in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Number of attacks before and after the CVE disclo- 
sure. t0  is the disclosure date [16].
Figure 6: Number of exploit variations before and after the 
CVE disclosure. t0  is the disclosure date  [16].
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Figure 7: Countermeasures details for zero-days expressed in 
a timeline.
4The National Institute of Standards and Technology from the United 
States
In this segment, the dangerousness of a zero-
day was exposed, in both cases, before and after 
its disclosure. To emphasize, after the CVE (or 
another method) is published, it is just a matter 
of time for someone develops an exploit and 
spread over the web, facilitating the exploitation 
of a resource and increasing the attack rate. 
This amount of attacks will increment and last 
over time until patches and security solutions 
will be implemented. Furthermore, this would 
remain for a considerable amount of time due 
to the exploit evolution and variations with the 
same CVE.
III. COUNTERMEASURES AND 
TECHNIQUES
Security mitigation and countermeasure 
perform an essential role in the exploitability 
of a vulnerability. Exploitable vulnerabilities 
and affected services can be retained or at 
least deferred over time. There are different 
ways to counteract the direct influence on 
the  threat  implications  of  zero-day attacks. 
Standards such as ISO 27000 or NIST4 have 
various approaches to dealing with computer 
issues. In the case of ISO 27001, section A-12 
refers to “Detection, prevention and mitigation 
controls to protect against malware shall be 
implemented, combined with appropriate user 
awareness” which is also applicable for the 
case of zero-day [18]. The explanation of them 
is below, followed by contemporary examples 
in Section IV-A.
caused by this problem. Figure 7 illustrates that 
they act during the attack and use the methods 
explained as follows:
(i) Signaturebased: It is a  method 
regularly  employed by antivirus scanners 
and attempts to discover nonpolymorphic 
malware (worms and viruses). A signature 
is a unique part of an exploit; it is usually 
a string with an impossible date or a hash 
value. Anti-viruses scanners and security 
software have signatures databases that are 
used to find malware [4], [15].
A database contains the signatures 
previously found in old files, and these are 
compared  with  new  data  to find evolved 
malware and harmful files. For zero-day, 
a payload comparison of old malware is 
carried out. As previously mentioned, a zero-
day is exploited with several vulnerabilities, 
but these are not necessarily zero-day. 
These libraries are continually updated. 
The comparison procedure depends on 
the algorithm used. For instance, in [19], 
an approach based on the decoding and 
encoding of the requests received (used 
as a signature) is presented; these requests 
are analyzed by a neural network to detect 
anomalies in the requested parameters.
(ii) Statistical-based: Statistic techniques 
are one of the most popularly used methods 
for detecting difficulties in a network, 
software or unknown intruder. This technique 
saves computer records of occurred events 
(conditions, performances, network or 
memory statistics, among others) that left 
a trace in the past and compares them with 
a new running record. If a record does not 
match, an alert is triggered when different 
stats are discovered, and they are blocked 
whether it is necessary. Consequently, if 
more data would gather, the detection 
algorithm will be more reliable and more 
precise.
In the case of zero-day, it can be contradictory 
because there is no preliminary data. 
Nevertheless, the method can be applied 
with procedures based on statistics profiles 
from system’s data to detect new actions 
in an identical scenario. For example, in 
[12] a probabilistic approach is presented 
to detect abnormal patterns in a network, 
uncovering these dilemmas.
(iii) Behavior-based: They are based 
directly on the conduct of a system or 
application, trying to forecast an expected 
behavior to detect anomalies, whether 
it would differ or not. Behavior-based 
strategies use unusual marks that can leave 
an attack, but the problem with this method 
A.Detection
Any feature with Internet access is exposed 
to zero-day attack, but antivirus scanners, 
Internet Detection System (IDS), and other 
mechanisms are commonly employed to detect 
possible threats in a system or organization. 
Nevertheless, these do not operate for new 
vulnerabilities; some strategies have been 
developed to dispense or to limit the damage 
is that a large number of false positives (or 
false negatives) may occur. For this field, 
it could be beneficial to rely only on the 
regular conduct of the defended system 
because these vulnerabilities would not exist 
in a database. The methodology proposed 
in [20] aims to analyze flows in real-time, 
finding anomalies that may be zero-day 
attacks, but as mentioned above, they have 
a large number of false positives/negatives 
anomalies that can be counterproductive.
B.Prevention
In business, zero day vulnerabilities can be 
chaotic, causing severe consequences for 
companies. Although this has already been 
mentioned and sounding repetitive,decisions 
and security efforts must be applied to prevent 
zero-day attacks (among others).
If an entity has a well established and conscious 
security structure and policies, a zero day attack 
is likely to be considerably less damaging. On 
the other hand, not having defenses will open 
up the possibility of unfortunate accidents with 
economic, structural and reputation effects 
[21]. Consequently, it is indispensable to take 
into account the probability of occurrence 
and common safety recommendations. This 
countermeasure is performed previous the 
assault, and below is a brief explanation of 
strategies to prevent them:
(i) Security best practices manuals and 
resources: The standards are studied, 
created, and imposed for the prevention 
of failures that cause problems; for this 
explanation, it is necessary to apply these 
standards for preventing.
(ii) Security patching and updates: 
The new versions of the software are 
bringing for a reason; vendors should 
know their vulnerabilities and updates can 
appropriately protect the system from zero-
day exploitation.
(iii) Advance security hardware and 
software: Secure programming, Quality 
Assurances (QA), and other measures to 
regulate the responsibility of programmers 
are not enough. Therefore, it is necessary to 
use tools that complement this and reduce 
zero-day attacks, for example, secure code 
scanners could be used.
(iv) Security protocols: Inventing and 
creating something that already exists is 
entirely insecure; the protocols are tested 
and approved for several years, entities 
should not implement algorithms or 
methods that are easy to implement. For 
example, the cryptographic algorithms.
Generally, they are ordinary security operations 
of an organization; hence there are not many 
approaches that perform prevention in this 
field. However, in  [21],  they  perform  a risk 
assessment for these threats focusing on 
the method of attack graph-based security 
metric, which analyzes the risks quantitatively, 
examining access vector, access complexity, 
among others factors. This solution contributes 
to having a risk control for unknown 
vulnerabilities, preventing and reducing the 
impact on an organization.
On the other hand, as future work, we will 
propose creating a tool for the prevention of 
zero-days attacks that will focus on day zero 
(disclosure day) to control and reduce the risk 
on the vulnerable assets of an organization.
C.Mitigation
Having a zero-day issue will not last just for 
a day, an organization can suffer from these 
attacks and not find a solution (an official 
patch) for a considerable amount of time, as 
mentioned in II-B. In this time gap, damage 
mitigation is needed; thus, security flaws may 
be less damaging or nonexistent until a solution 
would be available. Therefore, the zero-day 
mitigation approach will focus on the point 
where it begins until the point where an official 
patch is provided, in Figure 3 these points are 
represented from ta to te.
To apply mitigation into the real world, different 
methodologies and standards can pursue that 
apply measures for different environments. In 
this aspect, the leading best practices should 
be implemented: monitoring the behavior of a 
resource, granting least privileges, only relying 
on verified sources, using white lists, and finally 
having backup measures in case of data loss.
An example that applies mitigation to zero-day 
is found in [22]. They propose an approach 
using a critical data sharing protocol in the 
scenarios with a potential zero-day threat, 
evaluating the risk that can categorize them to 
establish a level of confidence. In this process, 
the case of a zero-day attack is to guarantee 
that the least important data will be exposed, 
expecting an early detection that would not 
compromise more critical assets.
IV. DISCUSSION
The full zero-day cycle explains the whole 
process involved, the attacker’s mind, and the 
interests behind these types of attacks. The 
complete cycle is not short, as is generally 
believed; it takes time to find a vulnerable 
point and, consequently, develop an exploit 
for these attacks. Stakeholders are involved 
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5A ransomware is considered a type of malware that implements 
cryptog- raphy to harm data from a device. It encrypts the victim’s data 
with a secret key to block access from a genuine user [15].
in this branch not only because of damaging 
or accessing susceptible systems. Behind it, 
the main interest is the money, as analyzed 
in section II-C2. Vulnerability markets move a 
massive amount of capital, regardless of the 
legal or illegal team.
It is not simple to join this world; researchers 
require a great set of skills and experiences to 
develop a zero-day attack. It is also essential an 
adequate computing power and resources for 
performing actions at this level and analyzing 
the different factors that a system may have 
for a potential flaw. Although this becomes 
more feasible today through virtualization and 
other solutions, it is a fact that the resulting 
attack change in a real environment, then it 
is necessary to perform tests and attacks on 
existing real assets. Thus, the threat actors 
must have security measures to hide his 
identity and conceal their attack (even more 
critical) because if the zero-day vulnerability is 
detected, it will become public and patched.
The life extension of a zero-day exploit is 
much longer than commonly thought. For 
this reason, in IT management, it could 
be necessary to take certain precautions 
respecting to vulnerabilities. Having out of 
date systems might remain dangerous for up 
to 10 years after the zero-day exploit has been 
launched (and patched). That is why it would 
be convenient to have a tool which could alert 
as soon as possible when a zero-day appears, 
and whether possible assets vulnerable are 
present to a new potential attack. In the next 
section are presented the existing solutions.
A.Existing solutions
Currently, exceptional studies exist that try 
to counteract the predicament of zero-day 
attacks; each individual is attempting to 
resolve this problem in a particular direction 
by concentrating on its objective with 
diverse methodologies. In Table I, some of 
the contemporary studies are presented, 
identifying their main aspects and approaches.
Firstly, Table I shows that most studies are 
focused on the network environment, and the 
main objective protected will be through it. 
Here, distinct techniques and mechanisms are 
used for distinct solutions; however, only [20] 
tries to give a real-time solution, which should 
be the most effective.
Furthermore, it reflects that the most of 
approaches propose to perform a zero-day 
detection([12], [19], [23], [24], [25], 26]); this is 
logical because if it could detect 100% of them, 
zero-days would cease to exist. However, it is 
not possible due to this vulnerability’s nature; 
consequently, it is essential to think about 
other containment methods. Finally, this table 
shows that different detection strategies are 
employed as a solution; most of them were 
mentioned in III-A.
A single prevention method is used, which 
focuses on analyzing the risks that certain 
assets may offer to find preventive methods that 
follow specific standards. On the other hand, 
there are a few more solutions for mitigation 
([22], [27], [28]), and it is essential to highlight 
the solution presented in [28], which includes 
two countermeasures in one, detection and 
mitigation. They decide to detect zero-day 
but are aware that their tools could fail, then 
they propose to have a mitigation mechanism 
through reliable protocols and different 
treatment to avoid having more vulnerable 
data exposed.
To conclude, there are limited approaches 
related to web attacks; this is “Tang2020” 
focuses on WAFs, which tries to detect 
web-only vulnerabilities such as SQLI (SQL 
injection), XSS (Cross-Site-Scripting), RCE 
(Remote Code Execution), among others. 
In the future, zero-day web-based solutions 
will be necessary to develop, as all assets are 
currently being moved to the cloud systems 
and related operations.
B.Open issues and research challenges
The main open issues are web applications, 
cloud computing, virtualization, and others 
omitted in common zero-day studies. The 
reason is that defending against cyberattack’s 
surface represents a fundamental challenge, 
and the main issue is recognizing the point 
of attacks and the system vulnerabilities 
that cybercriminals could exploit [29]. These 
are the current trends and they are growing 
exponentially; that is why it is imperative to 
start studying these areas. However, massive 
companies related to this field have their 
research programs and their bug bounty 
programs, but this may not be enough in the 
real world because threat actors are constantly 
innovating and finding new ways of exploiting 
them, resulting in critical future problems that 
have not been analyzed yet.
Since 2017, an exponential increase in 
ransomware5  has risen, where different 
types of zero-day vulnerabilities have been 
exploited to create this malware. The losses 
are millionaires affecting companies as large 
as small, and almost 50 percent of these 
attacks end up with organizations losing 
their  data  or  paying  criminals  to  recover 
them  [30].  This problem results in a research 
challenge for controlling the future. Therefore, 
it is fundamental to consider this situation to 
mitigate and detect these growing and critical 
threats. future. Therefore, it is fundamental to 
consider this situation to mitigate and detect 
these growing and critical threats.
Deep learning and related methods usually 
require massive data, which means a powerful 
capacity of processing and other high 
computing characteristics. Consequently, 
trying to detect an anomaly when an attack 
is running could be useless or unlikely. New 
strategic approaches should be considered to 
defend and counterattack because traditional 
tactical strategies would not work in the future, 
such as an IDS with an approach in both 
detection and prevention capabilities [31].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK
Zero-day vulnerabilities and attacks can be 
highly critical for indefinite fields of computing. 
They operate a malicious behavior before the 
disclosure day, but can continue after their 
patch or until other solutions are released. 
Although the human factor may be the 
fault factor, prevention and mitigation could 
minimize the risk and avoid these issues.
Table I: Various measures to counteract a zero-day attack.
This paper presented a detailed study of 
how a zero-day behaves and operates, from 
discovering the vulnerability to the attack 
performed in a real environment. This learning 
process includes a background of essential 
knowledge, and the zero-day cycle is developed 
in a general idea. Besides, understanding the 
threat actor’s role is addressed to explain how 
it works behind the scene and assimilates all 
the back- ground motivational factors.
A state-of-the-art comparison was also 
exhibited regarding countermeasures, which 
explains the current solutions’ approach and 
mechanisms. It shows that most of these 
solutions focus on detection, while prevention 
is underestimated, and limited solutions are 
available. It is advisable to continue digging on 
this approach. Finally, the open problems were 
exposed jointly with research challenges for 
future work to counteract the impact.
Conclusively, we plan to develop a zero-day 
laboratory that prevents and detects attacks 
launched on a day zero based on the reasons 
outlined in this study. Building on this can test 
several scenarios to avoid attacks by searching 
for assets, finding a vulnerability, and reducing 
the damage exposed there. 
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Furthermore, this archetype will be divided 
into two main modules. The first module has 
the task of preventing attacks published and 
dispersed throughout the web, analyzing their 
relevance and the assets’ attack surface to be 
protected in an entity. However, this will be 
complemented by a detection module. The 
use of big data will be integrated for detection 
to analyze massive data to find behavioral 
anomalies that may present specific patterns 
of Zero-day attacks.
This proposal will differentiate this approach 
by having a hybrid model of prevention and 
detention simultaneously, besides applying 
big data to find spontaneous and random 
information not analyzed in standard strategies 
mentioned before. This method will aim to 
provide a solution that can detect anomalies 
with a low rate of false positives or false 
negatives.
Finally, the comparison in Table I showed that 
there is no systematic review of literature 
exclusive related to Zero-day studies. Therefore, 
conducting a SLR in this field is relevant and 
it is proposed as future work for the project 
members.
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